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In traditional image and video content protection schemes, called fully layered, the whole content is first compressed. Then,
the compressed bitstream is entirely encrypted using a standard cipher (DES, AES, IDEA, etc.). The specific characteristics of
this kind of data (high-transmission rate with limited bandwidth) make standard encryption algorithms inadequate. Another
limitation of fully layered systems consists of altering the whole bitstream syntax which may disable some codec functionalities.
Selective encryption is a new trend in image and video content protection. It consists of encrypting only a subset of the data.
The aim of selective encryption is to reduce the amount of data to encrypt while preserving a suﬃcient level of security. This
computation saving is very desirable especially in constrained communications (real-time networking, high-definition delivery,
and mobile communications with limited computational power devices). In addition, selective encryption allows preserving some
codec functionalities such as scalability. This tutorial is intended to give an overview on selective encryption algorithms. The
theoretical background of selective encryption, potential applications, challenges, and perspectives is presented.
Copyright © 2008 A. Massoudi et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
Because of the explosion of networks and the huge amount
of content transmitted along, securing video content is
becoming more and more important. A traditional approach
for content access control is to first encode data with a
standard compressor and then to perform full encryption
of the compressed bitstream with a standard cipher (DES,
AES, IDEA, etc.). In this scheme, called fully layered,
compression and encryption are totally disjoint processes.
The media stream is processed as a classical text data
with the assumption that all symbols or bits in the plain
text are of equal importance. This scheme is relevant
when the transmission of the content is unconstrained.
In situations where only few resources are available (real-
time networking, high-definition delivery, low memory,
low power, or computation capabilities), this approach
seems inadequate. Shannon [1] pointed out the specific
characteristic of image and video content: high-transmission
rate and limited allowed bandwidth, which justifies the
inadequacy of standard cryptographic techniques for such
content. Another limitation of the fully layered scheme
consists of altering the original bitstream syntax. Therefore,
many functionalities of the encoding scheme may be disabled
(e.g., scalability). Some recent works explored a new way of
securing the content, named, partial encryption or selective
encryption, soft encryption, perceptual encryption, by applying
encryption to a subset of a bitstream. The main goal of
selective encryption is to reduce the amount of data to
encrypt while achieving a required level of security. An
additional feature of selective encryption is to preserve some
functionalities of the original bitstream (e.g., scalability). The
general approach is to separate the content into two parts.
The first part is the public part, it is left unencrypted and
made accessible to all users. The second part is the protected
part; it is encrypted. Only authorized users have access to
protected part. One important feature in selective encryption
is to make the protected part as small as possible.
How to define public and protected parts depends on the
target application. In some applications (video on demand,
database search, etc.), it could be desirable to encourage
customers to buy the content. For this purpose, only a soft
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visual degradation is achieved, so that an attacker would
still understand the content but prefer to pay to access the
full-quality unencrypted content. However, for sensitive data
(e.g., military images/videos, etc.), hard visual degradation
could be desirable to completely disguise the visual content.
The peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) is the common
criterion used to evaluate visual degradation.
This paper is intended to give an overview of state-
of-the-art selective encryption algorithms. We introduce
selective encryption in a close link to Shannon’s work on
information theory in Section 1.2. Evaluation criteria of
selective encryption algorithms are presented in Section 1.2.
In Section 1.3, we give one classification of selective encryp-
tion algorithms. Section 2 proposes potential applications of
selective encryption. In Section 3, we will present a summary
of diﬀerent selective encryption algorithms, their advantages,
and limitations. In Section 4, based on previous discussion,
we will discuss the principal challenges and perspectives for
selective encryption.
1.1. Shannon and selective encryption
In [2–4], Lookabaugh pointed out the close link between
selective encryption and Shannon’s work on communication
and security [1]. It is well known that statistics for image and
video data diﬀer much from classical text data. Indeed, image
and video data are strongly correlated and have strong spa-
tial/temporal redundancy. In addition, contrarily to banking
information or other highly sensitive information, the image
and video content has high-information rate with low value
from the security point of view. Shannon highlighted the
relationship between source statistics and the ciphertext
security; a secure encryption scheme should remove all the
redundancies in the plaintext, so that no exploitable cor-
relation is observed in the ciphertext. Shannon introduced
the equivocation function as a measure of how much a
cryptanalyst is uncertain of the plaintext observing a set
of ciphertexts. Figure 1 illustrates the definition above. A
unicity distance nu is defined as the minimum number of
ciphertext blocks required to yield a unique solution in a




where H(k) is the key entropy, and ris the plaintext
redundancy. From this, we can say that the less redundant
the source code is, the more secure the ciphertext is.
Shannon favors a fully layered system (see Figure 2), where
perfect lossless compression is first performed to remove
“all” redundancies from the plaintext (a perfect compressor
achieves a rate equal to the source entropy), and then full
encryption is applied. Shannon argues that the compressor
should be perfect, this means that, given a plaintext P, let
P′ be its “perfect” compression by the perfect compressor.
We can split P′ into two parts P′1 and P
′
2. Then, let C1
and C2 be the encryption of P′1 and P
′
2 by the encryption
algorithm (see Figure 2). Perfect compression implies that
if we know only P′1, then P
′
2 is completely unpredictable.






Figure 1: Key equivocation function.
This can be demonstrated using a proof by contradiction.
If the statement above was false, then an extra prediction
block would yield additional compression of P′2 based on P
′
1.
This is impossible since we assumed that the compression
is perfect [3]. This result is very interesting; let us consider
a configuration, where only a subset of the compressed
bitstream requires protection (e.g., P′1) we can replace the
encryption block by a selective encryption one. Only the
protected subset is encrypted (P′1 as illustrated in Figure 3),
and the security of the ciphertext is preserved for the
same reasons discussed above, with the assumption that all
redundancies of the source were removed. P′1 is protected and
unpredictable from P′2 because the compressor is perfect.
Hence, good compression is a good help for the security
of selective encryption. The only question that remains is
which part to encrypt to obtain a desired visual degradation.
In Shannon’s theory, the energy of the “perfectly” com-
pressed plaintext is uniformly distributed, thus encrypting
a fraction of the compressed plaintext would yield the same
fraction of distortion on the ciphertext. However, most exist-
ing compression algorithms are not perfect and concentrate
information energy unevenly in the bitstream; for example,
in JPEG, the bits that encode the DC coeﬃcients have
stronger impact on the reconstruction quality than the AC
coeﬃcients. In wavelet-based compression algorithms, most
of the signal energy is concentrated in lower resolutions.
One advantage of energy concentration is that it gives a hint
about which part of the bitstream to encrypt. Most state-
of-the-art selective encryption algorithms exploit this energy
concentration.
This gap between theoretical selective encryption which
is based on perfect compression and existing selective
encryption algorithms makes the security aspect more
diﬃcult to evaluate. In most cases, visual degradation is used
as the exclusive security measure of selective encryption by
assuming that harder visual distortion implies more security.
It turns out that this argument is not relevant as can be
observed in related works.
1.2. Evaluation criteria
We need to define a set of evaluation criteria that will help
evaluating and comparing selective encryption algorithms.
Some criteria listed below are gathered from the literature.
We introduce new criteria that were not considered previ-
ously.










Figure 2: Fully layered system: the whole compressed bitstream is
encrypted.
(I) Tunability (T)
Most of the proposed algorithms in the literature use static
definition of encrypted part and encryption parameters.
This property limits the usability of the algorithm to a
restricted set of applications. It could be very desirable to
be able to dynamically define the encrypted part and the
encryption parameters with respect to diﬀerent applications
and requirements.
(II) Visual degradation (VD)
This criterion measures the perceptual distortion of the
cipher image (or video) with respect to the plain image
(or video). It assumes that the cipher image (or video) can
be decoded and viewed without decryption. This assump-
tion is not satisfied for all existing algorithms. In some
applications, it could be desirable to achieve enough visual
degradation, so that an attacker would still understand the
content but prefer to pay to access the unencrypted content.
However, for sensitive data (e.g., military images/videos),
high visual degradation could be desirable to completely
disguise the visual content. For this reason, tunability
property is very important to be able to tune the visual
degradation of the encrypted content depending on the
target application and requirements. The peak signal-to-
noise ratio (PSNR) is the main metric used in the literature
to measure visual degradation. Visual degradation is a
subjective criterion that is why it is diﬃcult to define a
threshold for acceptable visual distortion regarding a given
application.
(III) Cryptographic security (CS)
Most of the research works on selective encryption evaluate
the security level based only on visual degradation. In [5],
Tang proposes a selective encryption algorithm based on DES
encryption of DC coeﬃcients and replacing the zigzag scan
of the AC coeﬃcients by a random permutation. The visual
degradation achieved is very high, but the cryptographic
security of the algorithm is very weak as pointed out in [6, 7].
The cryptographic security should rely on
(i) the encryption key (of a well-scrutinized encryption
algorithm),
(ii) unpredictability of the encrypted part.









Figure 3: In perfect compression configuration, a subset of the
bitstream can be encrypted; protected part is not predictable from
the public one.
(IV) Encryption ratio (ER)
This criterion measures the ratio between the size of the
encrypted part and the whole data size. Encryption ratio has
to be minimized by selective encryption.
(V) Compression friendliness (CF)
A selective encryption algorithm is considered compression
friendly if it has no or very little impact on data compression
eﬃciency. Some selective encryption algorithms impact data
compressibility or introduce additional data that is necessary
for decryption. It is desirable that this impact remains
limited.
(VI) Format compliance (FC)
The encrypted bitstream should be compliant with the
compressor. Any standard decoder should be able to decode
the encrypted bitstream without decryption. This property is
very important because it allows preserving some features of
the compression algorithm used (e.g., scalability).
(VII) Error tolerance (ET)
This criterion is not very considered in the literature. It
is very desirable especially in networks prone to errors. As
standard ciphers are required to have strong avalanche eﬀect,
a single bit error that occurs in the encrypted bitstream
during transmission will propagate many other bits after
decryption. This causes decoding failure or important dis-
tortion to the plain data at the receiver side. A challenge is to
design a secure selective encryption algorithm that trades oﬀ
important avalanche eﬀect and error tolerance.
1.3. Classification of selective encryption algorithms
One possible classification of selective encryption algorithm
is relative to when encryption is performed with respect
to compression. This classification is adequate since it has
intrinsic consequences on selective encryption algorithms
behavior. We consider three classes of algorithms as follows.
(I) Precompression
Selective encryption algorithms from this class perform
encryption before compression (resp., decompression before
decryption) (see Figure 4). Note that these algorithms are
inherently format compliant and generally inapplicable









Figure 4: Precompression approach.










Figure 5: Incompression approach.
for lossy compression. Finally, in most cases, performing
encryption prior to compression causes bandwidth expan-
sion which adversely impact compression eﬃciency. Hence,
this class of algorithms is generally not compression friendly.
(II) Incompression
Selective encryption algorithms from this class perform joint
compression and encryption (resp., joint decompression
and decryption) (see Figure 5). Algorithms from this class
imply modifications of both encoder and decoder which
may adversely impact format compliance and compression
friendliness.
(III) Postcompression
Selective encryption algorithms from this class perform
compression before encryption (resp., decryption before
decompression) (see Figure 6). This class of algorithms
is generally compression friendly; small overhead can be
introduced to send the encryption key or some information
about encryption. Encryption and decryption do not need
modifications at encoder or decoder sides. Finally, it was
suggested in [8] that postcompression class is inherently
nonformat compliant. In this paper, we give example of
existing algorithms that achieve format compliance by using
pattern-constrained encryption.
2. APPLICATIONS
Digital multimedia content is becoming widely used over
networks and public channels (cable, satellite, wireless
networks, Internet, etc.), which is unsecured transmission
media. Many applications that exploit these channels (pay-
TV, videoconferences, medical imaging, etc.) need to rely
on access control systems to protect their content. Standard










Figure 6: Postcompression approach.
but at the cost of expensive implementation and impor-
tant transmission delays. Selective encryption comes as an
alternative that aims at providing suﬃcient security with
an important gain in computational complexity and delays.
This allows a variety of possible applications for selective
encryption. Below, we give a set of potential applications as
follows.
(I) Mobile communication
PDAs, mobile phones, and other mobile terminals are
more and more used for multimedia communication (voice,
image, video, etc.) while still requiring copyright protection
and access control. Their moderate resolution, computa-
tional power, and limited battery life impose to make an
eﬀort in reducing the encryption computational complexity
to save battery life, silicon area, and cost. Image and video
content have lower value than banking information, for
example. Thus, it is not necessary to encrypt the whole data.
It would be enough to degrade content quality so that people
would prefer to buy a full-quality version.
(II) Monitoring encrypted content
One can imagine a situation where the encrypted content
itself is usable for monitoring. For example, in many
applications such as military images, video surveillance
(where some faces have to be scrambled), media audience,
identifying a partially encrypted content without decryption
can be desirable.
(III) Multiple encryptions
Eﬃcient overlay of more than one encryption system within
a single bitstream can be very desirable. In a scheme
where a TV broadcaster using an encryption system that
is proprietary of one supplier wants to introduce new
encryption systems of new independent suppliers, he would
like to optimize bandwidth use by avoiding duplicating every
channel on the network. Selective encryption could be very
helpful; only a small fraction of the channel is duplicated
(the part that will be encrypted). Each duplicated part will
go through one supplier equipment and be encrypted by
its encryption system. The remaining part (the shared one)
will be sent once in the network and in the clear. Sony’s
Passage system proposed for the US cable market is a concrete
example of this application [9]. This solution is particularly
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desirable when the suppliers are not willing to agree on
a shared scrambling solution as done in DVB Simulcrypt
[10].
(IV) Transcodability/scalability of encrypted content
These are very desirable properties in image and video
communication. Some compression algorithms such as
JPEG-2000 allow natural transcodability/scalability thanks
to its embedded-code nature. For some other algorithms it
is necessary to decompress and recompress at lower bitrate
at intermediate routers of the transmission channel. When
the content is fully encrypted, decryption, decompression,
and recompression at lower bitrate and reencryption are
needed at intermediate routers. It may also cause important
transmission delays and defeat the security of the system
since access to the encryption key is needed at the network
nodes. Selective encryption could be a good response to
this problem. Encrypting a small fraction of the content
while sending the remainder in the clear allows transcod-
ability and scalability without accessing the encryption keys;
the basic part (needed by all users) is sent in the clear
(unencrypted) while the encrypted enhancement part is sent
only to authorized users who paid to access the full-quality
content.
(V) Database search
Selectively encrypted content can be used as low-quality
previews that are made public. This preview will be used as
a catalog to select content and pay to be able to decrypt and
view it.
(VI) Renewable security systems
In their eternal battle against pirates, digital rights manage-
ment systems have to periodically update their technologies
and equipments all along the network. Changing the whole
infrastructure would be very costly. Selective encryption
can avoid the burden of having to change a whole system.
Because of computational complexity saving due to selective
encryption, it is possible to move to software solutions




Tang, 1996. The basic idea of the selective encryption
algorithm proposed in [5] is to selectively encrypt I-frames
of the MPEG stream; DES on DC coeﬃcients (preferably
in CBC mode to avoid dictionary attack) and random
permutation on the AC coeﬃcients instead of the standard
zigzag. This is done before compression.
(a) Tunability: the algorithm is not tunable since encryp-
tion parameters are static.
(b) Visual degradation: since intraframes are very impor-
tant in MPEG compression (all B- and P-frames are
computed accordingly to I-frames), by encrypting
them, high-visual degradation is achieved.
(c) Cryptographic security: the AC coeﬃcients zigzag
scan used in I-frames encoding is replaced by a
pseudorandom permutation. Statistics of the AC
coeﬃcients are preserved. Therefore, ciphertext-only,
chosen, and known-plaintext attacks are feasible and
allow recovering all AC coeﬃcients. Qiao et al. [6]
and Uehara and Safavi-Naini [7] propose crypt-
analytic attacks (chosen-plaintext attacks) on this
approach. The DC coeﬃcient can be set to a fixed
value while still having a comprehensible result, and
then a chosen or known-plaintext attack can be
conducted to reconstruct the AC coeﬃcients and
get a semantically good reconstruction [11]. Two
conclusions can be made. First, energy concentration
is not systematically a good criterion for selective
encryption. Second, high-visual distortion does not
mean high security level.
(d) Encryption ratio: not specified.
(e) Compression friendliness: the nonoptimal scanning of
the DCT coeﬃcients introduces loss in compression
eﬃciency of about 40% [6]. Indeed, this adversely
aﬀects Huﬀman encoding (due to distortion of
the probability distribution of run-lengths for AC
coeﬃcients).
(f) Format compliance: the proposed scheme is compli-
ant to JPEG and MPEG standards.
(g) Error tolerance: the proposed algorithm is not tolerant
to errors that occur at DC coeﬃcients. The avalanche
eﬀect of DES in CBC mode causes important error
propagation.
(h) Data type: image and video.
Shi and Bhargava, 1998. In [12], the authors proposed video
encryption algorithm (VEA) which uses a secret key to
randomly change the signs of all DCT coeﬃcients in an
MPEG stream (this is justified by the fact that DCT sign bits
are very random, thus neither predictable nor compressible).
In [13], the authors present a new version of VEA reducing
computational complexity; it consists in encrypting the sign
bits of diﬀerential values of DC coeﬃcients of I-frames and
sign bits of diﬀerential values of motion vectors of B- and
P-frames.
(a) Tunability: not tunable, the proposed algorithm relies
on static parameters.
(b) Visual degradation: high-visual degradation due to
the encryption of DCT coeﬃcients and motion
vectors.
(c) Cryptographic security: the first version of VEA [12]
is only secure if the secret key is used once. Other-
wise, knowing one plaintext and the corresponding
ciphertext, the secret key can be computed by
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XORing the DCT sign bits. Both versions of VEA
are vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks; in [12], it
is feasible to create a repetitive/periodic pattern and
then compute its inverse DCT. The encryption of the
image obtained will allow us to get the key length
and even compute the secret key by chosen-plaintext
attack.
(d) Encryption ratio: not specified.
(e) Compression friendliness: not specified.
(f) Format compliance: the encrypted bitstream is MPEG
compliant.
(g) Error tolerance: any error in motion vector bits may
have important adverse impact on the decidability of
the bitstream.
(h) Data type: video.
Shi, Wang and Bhargava, 1999. In [14], a new version of
the modified VEA presented in [13] is proposed, called real-
time video encryption algorithm for (RVEA). It encrypts
selected sign bits of the DC coeﬃcients and/or sign bits of
motion vectors using DES or IDEA. Sixty four sign bits are
encrypted per frame (starting by DC coeﬃcients because
they concentrate most of the frame energy).
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: changing the sign bit of one DC
coeﬃcient will aﬀect all the following ones in I-
frames (since they are diﬀerentially encoded), the
same thing applies for motion vectors in P- and B-
frames; the sign changes not only the direction but
also motion magnitude, since they are diﬀerentially
encoded. The visual degradation achieved is very
high.
(c) Cryptographic security: bounding the encryption to
the first 64 sign bits is not suﬃcient from the
security point of view. Indeed, when considering
high-resolution videos with high bitrate, the first
64 bits represent a very small fraction of the data.
(d) Encryption ratio: only 64 bits are encrypted per frame.
Thus, encryption reduction depends on the image
bitrate.
(e) Compression friendliness: not specified.
(f) Format compliance: the proposed scheme is MPEG
compliant.
(g) Error tolerance: poor error tolerance is achieved due
to motion information encryption.
(h) Data type: video.
Podesser, Schmidt and Uhl, 2002. In [15], a selective bitplane
encryption (using AES) is proposed, several experiments
were conducted on 8-bit grayscale images, and the main
results retained are the following: (1) encrypting only the
MSB is not secure; a replacement attack is possible [15], (2)
encrypting the first two MSBs gives hard visual degradation,
and (3) encrypting three bitplanes gives very hard visual
degradation.
(a) Tunability: the algorithm is not tunable; a fixed
number of bits need to be encrypted to guarantee
confidentiality.
(b) Visual degradation: for 8 bits per pixel uncompressed
image, hard visual degradation (of 9 dB) can be
observed for a minimum of 3 MSB bits encrypted.
(c) Cryptographic security: even when a secure cipher
is used (AES), the selective encryption algorithm
proposed is vulnerable to replacement attacks [15].
This attack does not break AES but replaces the
encrypted data with an intelligible one. It is worth
to note that visual distortion is a subjective criterion
and does not allow to measure security as illustrated
in this example.
(d) Encryption ratio: at least 3 bitplanes over 8 (more than
37.5%) of the bitstream have to be encrypted using
AES to achieve suﬃcient security.
(e) Compression friendliness: this algorithm is intended
for uncompressed data. However, important band-
width expansion is introduced by selectively encrypt-
ing MSBs which adversely impact the compressibility
of encrypted images.
(f) Format compliance: as a precompression algorithm, it
is format compliant.
(g) Error tolerance: the avalanche eﬀect of AES causes
important error propagation.
(h) Data type: uncompressed image.
Zeng and Lei, 2003. In [16], selective encryption in the
frequency domain (8 × 8 DCT and wavelet domains) is
proposed. The general scheme consists of selective scram-
bling of coeﬃcients by using diﬀerent primitives (selective
bit scrambling, block shuﬄing, and/or rotation).
(I) Wavelet transform case
The proposed scheme combines two primitives.
(i) Selective bit scrambling: it is a bitplane selective
encryption; each individual coeﬃcient bitplane is
partitioned into a sign bit, which is very random and
uncorrelated with neighboring coeﬃcient sign bits,
thus highly unpredictable. Then significance bits (the
first nonzero magnitude bit and all subsequent zero
bits if any), these give a range for the coeﬃcient value.
These bits have low entropy and thus are highly com-
pressible. Finally, the refinement bits (all remaining
bits) are uncorrelated with neighboring coeﬃcients
and are randomly distributed.The authors propose to
randomly scramble sign bits and refinement bits. The
encryption algorithm is not specified.
(ii) Block shuﬄing: the basic idea is to shuﬄe the
arrangement of coeﬃcients within a block in a
way to preserve some spatial correlation; this can
achieve suﬃcient security without compromising
compression eﬃciency. Each subband is split into
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equal-sized blocks (the block size can be diﬀerent
for each subband). Within the same subband, block
coeﬃcients are shuﬄed according to a shuﬄing
table generated using a secret key (this table can be
diﬀerent from a subband to another or from one
frame to another). Since the shuﬄing is block based,
it is expected that most 2D local subband statistics are
preserved and compression not greatly impacted.
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: high-visual degradation is
achieved. Indeed, coeﬃcient change at low
resolutions propagates to larger parts at higher
resolutions.
(c) Cryptographic security: attacking the lowest
pyramid level of the wavelet decomposition
is much simpler (small block size and high
energy concentration) this helps to construct
the subsequent levels by correlation.
(d) Encryption ratio: about 20% of the data has to
be encrypted.
(e) Compression friendliness: little impact on com-
pression eﬃciency is observed (less than 5%).
(f) Format compliance: the algorithm proposed is
fully compliant to DWT-based compression
since the encryption is performed in the trans-
form domain prior to compression.
(g) Error tolerance: depends on the encryption
algorithm used to scramble sign bits.
(h) Data type: image and video.
(II) DCT transform case
The 8 × 8 DCT coeﬃcients can be considered as indi-
vidual local frequency components located at some sub-
band. The same scrambling operations as described above
(block shuﬄing and sign bits change) can be applied on
these “subbands.” I-, B-, and P-frames are processed in
diﬀerent manners. For I-frames, the image is first split
into segments of macroblocks (e.g., a segment can be a
slice), blocks/macroblocks of a segment can be spatially
disjoint and chosen at random spatial positions within
the frame. Within each segment, DCT coeﬃcients at the
same frequency location are shuﬄed together (in order to
preserve coeﬃcients distribution property). Then, sign bits
of AC coeﬃcients are randomly changed and DC coeﬃcients
(which are always positive for intracoded blocks) are flipped
with respective threshold (e.g., 255∗8/2 = maximum DC
value/2). There may be many intracoded blocks in P- and
B-frames. At least DCT coeﬃcients of the same intracoded
block in P- or B-frames are shuﬄed. Sign bits of motion
vectors are also scrambled.
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: high-visual degradation is
achieved. Indeed, most of the image energy is
concentrated in DC coeﬃcients, thus, encrypting
them aﬀects considerably the image content.
(c) Cryptographic security: vulnerable to chosen and
known plaintext attacks since it is based only on per-
mutations. In addition, replacing the DC coeﬃcients
with a fixed value still gives an intelligible version of
the image.
(d) Encryption ratio: if we consider only the AC sign bit
encryption, it represents 16 to 20% of data. This is
relatively high [16].
(e) Compression friendliness: a bitrate increase by about
20% is observed.
(f) Format compliance: compliant with JPEG and MPEG
standards.
(g) Error tolerance: depends on the encryption algorithm
used to scramble sign bits.
(h) Data type: image and video.
Van de Ville, Philips, Van de Walle, and Lemahieu, 2004. A
particular orthonormal transform is used in this proposal,
the discrete prolate spheroidal sequences (DPSSs) [17].
This is an adapted base to represent band limited signals
(which is the case for 2D images). A bandwidth preserving
scrambling is proposed; the image signal is projected on the
DPSS (which is a base for band limited signals). Then, the
transform coeﬃcients are scrambled using an orthonormal
(thus energy preserving) transform.
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: depends on the number of coeﬃ-
cients to scramble.
(c) Cryptographic security: a large key space is obtained
due to the use of equivalent Hadamard matrices
in the scrambling. However, statistical correlations
exist between coeﬃcients to encrypt; this leakage
has been exploited to mount an error-concealment-
based attack (ECA) [18]. Finally, the Hadamard
matrix-based encryption has insuﬃcient diﬀusion,
this leads to a reduction in key space. Experimental
results show that when guessing 100 random keys,
the best recovered image has low-visual degradation
compared to the unencrypted one.
(d) Encryption ratio: variable, it depends on the number
of coeﬃcients to scramble.
(e) Compression friendliness: limited bandwidth expan-
sion is allowed by this proposal. However, the major
drawback of this scheme is that the encryption
is lossy. Indeed, the encryption process implies a
rounding operation that induces precision loss (so
inadequate to lossless compression).
(f) Format compliance: as a precompression algorithm, it
is format compliant.
(g) Error tolerance: important error propagation due to
the avalanche property of Hadamard matrices used
in encryption.
(h) Data type: image.
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3.2. In-compression
Meyer and Gadegast, 1995. The algorithm is proposed for
MPEG selective encryption (called SECMPEG). It modifies
the MPEG stream [19]. It uses RSA or DES (in CBC mode)
and implements 4 levels of security.
(i) Encrypting all stream headers.
(ii) Encrypting all stream headers and all DC and lower
AC coeﬃcients of intracoded blocks.
(iii) Encrypting I-frames and all I-blocks in P- and B-
frames.
(iv) Encrypting all the bitstreams.
(a) Tunability: the algorithm can be considered as
tunable since many security levels are allowed.
(b) Visual degradation: the encrypted content is not
MPEG compliant, and thus cannot be viewed
without decryption.
(c) Cryptographic security: many security levels can
be obtained. Encrypting only stream headers is
not suﬃcient since this part is easily predictable.
(d) Encryption ratio: the number of I blocks in P
or B frames can be of the same order as the
number of I blocks in I frames. This reduces
considerably the eﬃciency of the selective
encryption scheme [20].
(e) Compression friendliness: no impact is observed
on the compression eﬃciency.
(f) Format compliance: the encoder proposed is
not MPEG compliant since it requires major
additions and changes to the standard; a special
encoder/decoder is required to read unen-
crypted SECMPEG streams.
(g) Error tolerance: the ciphers used for encryption
have important avalanche properties, especially
in CBC mode. Hence, poor error tolerance is
achieved.
(h) Data type: video.
Wu and Kuo, 2001. In [11, 21], based on a set of observations,
the authors point out that energy concentration does not
mean intelligibility concentration. Indeed, they discussed the
technique proposed by Tang [5]. They show that by fixing
DC values at a fixed value and recovering AC coeﬃcients
(by known or chosen plaintext attacks), a semantically
good reconstruction of the image is obtained. Even using
a very small fraction of the AC coeﬃcients does not fully
destroy the image semantic content. The authors argued that
both orthogonal transform-based compression algorithms
followed by quantization and compression algorithms that
end with an entropy coder stage are bad candidates to
selective encryption. They investigate another approach that
turns entropy coders into ciphers. They propose two schemes
for the most popular entropy coders: multiple Huﬀman
tables (MHTs) for the Huﬀman coder and multiple state
index (MSI) for the QM arithmetic coder.
(I) MHT
The authors propose a method using multiple Huﬀman
coding tables. Four Huﬀman tables are published, and
millions of diﬀerent tables are generated using a technique
called Huﬀman tree mutation [11, 21].
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: very high-visual degradation can
be achieved.
(c) Cryptographic security: Gillman and Rivest [22]
showed that decoding a Huﬀman coded bitstream
without any knowledge about the Huﬀman coding
tables would be very diﬃcult. However, the basic
MHT is vulnerable to known and chosen plaintext
attacks as pointed out in [23].
(d) Encryption ratio: variable, it depends on the size of
the data to encrypt. Indeed, the larger the data is, the
smaller the relative size of the Huﬀman table will be.
(e) Compression friendliness: no impact on compression
is observed, the encryption does not aﬀect the
probability distribution of symbols.
(f) Format compliance: not compliant, the decoder needs
to decrypt the Huﬀman table to be able to decom-
press.
(g) Error tolerance: as Huﬀman coding relies on variable
length codes, any single codeword error may propa-
gate at many subsequent codewords.
(h) Data type: image and video.
(II) MSI
The arithmetic QM coder is based on an initial state index;
the idea is to select 4 published initial state indices and to use
them in a random but secret order.
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: very high-visual degradation can
be achieved.
(c) Cryptographic security: high security level. It is very
diﬃcult to decode the bitstream without the knowl-
edge of the state index used to initialize the MQ coder.
(d) Encryption ratio: very low encryption ratio is
achieved. However, the computation cost is relatively
high; this is due to multiple updates in the QM coder
states.
(e) Compression friendliness: a little eﬀect on compres-
sion eﬃciency is observed. This is due to multiple
initializations of the QM coder due to initial state
index changing.
(f) Format compliance: not compliant. It is impossible to
decode without the encryption key.
(g) Error tolerance: frequent reset of state indices allows
high error tolerance.
(h) Data type: image and video.
A. Massoudi et al. 9
Wen, Severa, Zeng, Luttrel, and Jin, 2002. A general selective
encryption approach for fixed and variable length codes
(FLC and VLC) is proposed in [24]. FLC and VLC codewords
corresponding to important information carrying fields are
selected. Then, each codeword in the VLC and FLC (if the
FLC code space is not full) table is assigned a fixed length
code index, when we want to encrypt the concatenation
of some VLC (or FLC) codewords, only the indices are
encrypted (using DES). Then the encrypted concatenated
indices are mapped back to a diﬀerent but existing VLC.
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: very high-visual degradation can
be achieved.
(c) Cryptographic security: acceptable security level based
on the secrecy of the Huﬀman table.
(d) Encryption ratio: good encryption reduction (<15%).
(e) Compression friendliness: the encryption process
compromises the compression eﬃciency. Indeed,
some short VLC codewords (which are the most
probable/frequent) can be replaced by longer ones.
This is antagonistic with the entropy coding idea.
(f) Format compliance: the proposed scheme isfully com-
pliant to any compression algorithm that uses VLC or
FLC entropy coder.
(g) Error tolerance: any error aﬀecting one variable
length code may potentially propagate to subsequent
codewords.
(h) Data type: image and video.
Pommer and Uhl, 2003. The algorithm proposed in [25]
is based on AES encryption of the header information of
wavelet packet encoding of an image, this header specifies the
subband tree structure.
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: the encrypted content cannot be
viewed without decryption.
(c) Cryptographic security: no secure against chosen
plaintext attack. Because statistical properties of
wavelet coeﬃcients are preserved by the encryption,
then the approximation subband can be recon-
structed. This will give the attacker the size of the
approximation subband (lower resolution) and then
neighboring subbands can be reconstructed since
close subbands contain highly correlated coeﬃcients.
(d) Encryption ratio: the encrypted part represents a very
small fraction of the bitstream.
(e) Compression friendliness: the subband tree is pseu-
dorandomly generated. This adversely impacts the
compression eﬃciency.
(f) Format compliance: no format compliant; the encoder
does not use standard wavelet packet decomposition.
(g) Error tolerance: the avalanche eﬀect of AES cipher
causes poor error tolerance.
(h) Data type: image.
Lian, Sun, and Wang, 2004. A selective encryption algorithm
is proposed for JPEG2000 standard [26]. A quality factor
controls the strength of the encryption algorithm. The
encryption algorithm is performed in a bottom-up order
where detail data (high-resolution coeﬃcients) are encrypted
first. The algorithm consists in three steps.
(I) Selective sign bit encryption
A selected number (s) of sign bits are encrypted using a
chaotic stream cipher. The quality factor tunes s.
(II) Intra-bitplane permutation
For each bitplane, in each code block, a pseudorandom space
filling curve (PR-SFC) is used to permute bits of the same
bitplane. It seems that the algorithm uses the same SFC
for all bitplanes in a given bitplane. Hence, it is a simple
coeﬃcient permutation; this is not secure against ciphertext-
only, chosen- and known-plaintext attacks [27, 28]. Each
4 bits of a stripe column are grouped together to form a
unit element for the permutation (to be compliant to the
JPEG2000 standard). The SFC is chosen to preserve spatial
correlation of DWT coeﬃcients. The quality factor p tunes
the number of code-blocks to be intra-permuted.
(III) Interblocks permutation
Code blocks within the same subband are permuted using a
particular 2D chaotic map, the Cat map. If the quality factor
is above a certain threshold, no intercodeblock permutation
is performed.
(a) Tunability: dynamic encryption parameters can be
fine tuned to control visual distortion.
(b) Visual degradation: the encryption strength (and
hence the visual degradation) can be fine tuned using
a quality factor.
(c) Cryptographic security: low diﬀusion eﬀect, the
ciphertext is not key sensitive enough. In addition,
SFC is vulnerable to ciphertext-only, chosen- and
known-plaintext attacks [27, 28].
(d) Encryption ratio: variable, it depends on the parame-
ters selected for encryption.
(e) Compression friendliness: because bitplane encoding
depends from the previous bitplanes encoding, inde-
pendently encrypting each bitplane of a codeblock
will inevitably impact the arithmetic coder compres-
sion performance.
(f) Format compliance: JPEG2000 compliant.
(g) Error tolerance: chaotic stream ciphers allow high
error tolerance since each sign bit is independently
scrambled by a XOR.
(h) Data type: image and video.
Grangetto, Magli, and Olmo, 2006. The basic approach
proposed in [29] is a randomization of the arithmetic coder.
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This is achieved by randomly swapping the most probable
symbol (MSP) and least probable symbol (LSP) intervals.
Since only the interval magnitude is important for encoding,
the compression performance remains unchanged. Both
total and selective encryptions are possible by choosing
the layers or resolution levels to encrypt. Selective region
encryption is made possible since JPEG2000 is a codeblock-
based algorithm. To encrypt a region of interest, we have
to apply the encryption on the codeblocks contributing to
precincts of the region considered.
(a) Tunability: selective to full encryption is allowed.
Selective region encryption is allowed with dynamic
selection of codeblocks to encrypt.
(b) Visual degradation: depends on the number of code-
blocks to be encrypted.
(c) Cryptographic security: low security, brute force attack
is feasible. Indeed, trying 30 millions random keys
will allow retrieving the secret encryption key.
(d) Encryption ratio: variable, depends on the number of
codeblocks to be encrypted.
(e) Compression friendliness: no impact on compression.
(f) Format compliance: fully compliant to JPEG2000.
(g) Error tolerance: since arithmetic coding is context
based, any error will propagate to subsequent con-
texts and adversely impact probabilities computa-
tions.
(h) Data type: image and video.
Bergeron and Lamy-Bergot, 2005. A syntax compliant encryp-
tion algorithm is proposed for H.264/AVC [30]. Encryption
is inserted within the encoder. To achieve syntax compliance,
selected compliant codewords are randomly permuted with
other compliant codewords. The shift used for permutation
is determined by the AES counter.
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: 25 to 30 dB PSNR drop is
achieved. However, blocks at the border of video
frames cannot be encrypted. This leakage could be
important in some applications.
(c) Cryptographic security: the main drawback of this
scheme is the lack of cryptographic security. Indeed,
the security of the encrypted bitstream does not
depend more on the AES cipher. It depends on
the size of the compliant codewords. Hence, the
diﬀusion of the AES cipher is reduced to the plaintext
space size. In addition, a bias is introduced in the
ciphertext. This bias depends on the key size and the
plaintext space size.
(d) Encryption ratio: the paper does not give precise
values for overall encryption ratio. However, it is
mentioned that about 25% of I-slices and 10–15%
of P-slices are encrypted. Since intracoded slices can
represent 30–60%, the encryption ratio is expected to
be relatively high.
(e) Compression friendliness: negligible overhead is intro-
duced (0.1%) by the insertion of encryption key.
(f) Format compliance: the encrypted bitstream is decod-
able by any standard decoder without decryption.
However, for decryption, a modified decoder is
required.
(g) Error tolerance: the randomness of the permutation
causes poor error tolerance. Indeed, one single bit
error could result in many bit errors if the new
permuted codewords have many diﬀerent bits.
(h) Data type: video.
Engel and Uhl, 2006. In [31], a JPEG2000 lightweight
encryption scheme is proposed. Only lower resolutions
are compressed with classical dyadic wavelet transform.
For higher resolutions, the algorithm relies on a secret
transform domain constructed with anisotropic wavelet
packets (AWPs). The aim of this proposal is to allow trans-
parent encryption for applications requiring low-resolution
preview. Therefore, low resolution is accessible by all users
and decodable with any JPEG2000 compliant codec.
(a) Tunability: limited tunability is permitted. Only
lightweight encryption is allowed. Indeed, this algo-
rithm does not allow encrypting lower resolutions.
It is intended to particular applications with public
thumbnail preview.
(b) Visual degradation: high-visual degradation is achiev-
able.
(c) Cryptographic security: encryption key space is very
large ensuring high security level.
(d) Encryption ratio: very low, only the subband tree
structure is kept secret.
(e) Compression friendliness: only a slight drop in com-
pression performance can be observed.
(f) Format compliance: no compliant to JPEG2000, the
encrypted bitstream is not decodable without the
secret wavelet transform.
(g) Error tolerance: it oﬀers poor error tolerance since
any error in the encrypted parameters for generating
random AWP would severely impact the decoding of
the bitstream.
(h) Data type: image and video.
3.3. Postcompression
Spanos and Maples, 1995. Aegis mechanism is proposed [32];
it consists in DES (CBC mode) encryption of intraframes,
video stream header (all the decoding initialization param-
eters: frame size, frame rate, bitrate, etc.), and the ISO
32 bits end code of the MPEG stream. Experimental results
were conducted by the authors showing the importance of
selective encryption in high bitrate video transmission to
achieve acceptable end-to-end delay. It is also shown that full
encryption creates bottleneck (important end-to-end delay
and overflow in buﬀers) in high bitrate distributed video
applications.
A. Massoudi et al. 11
(a) Tunability: no tunability is allowed.
(b) Visual degradation: the encrypted content is not
MPEG compliant, and thus cannot be viewed with-
out decryption.
(c) Cryptographic security: Agi and Gong [33] showed
that this algorithm has low security since encrypting
of only I-frames oﬀers limited security because
of the intercorrelation of frames; some blocks are
intracoded in P- and B-frames. Furthermore, P- and
B-frames are highly correlated when they correspond
to the same I-frame. They also underlined that it
is unwise to encrypt stream headers since they are
predictable and can be broken by plaintext-ciphertext
pairs. Alattar and Al-Regib [34], apparently unaware
of Agi and Gong work [33], stressed the same security
leakage.
(d) Encryption ratio: I-frames alone occupy about 30 to
60% of the whole video stream, which is quite high.
Thus, no important encryption saving is achieved.
It is suggested that reducing I-frames frequency
could achieve better encryption eﬃciency; on the
other hand, this will adversely impact compression
performance and random acquisition delay in case of
channel change.
(e) Compression friendliness: the encryption is performed
after compression, thus no impact is observed on the
compression eﬃciency.
(f) Format compliance: the resulting bitstream is not
MPEG compliant; encrypting the end code conceals
the MPEG syntax.
(g) Error tolerance: DES in CBC mode oﬀers poor error
tolerance due to its avalanche property.
(h) Data type: video.
Alattar and Al-Regib, 1999. In [34], the security of Spanos
and Maples algorithm is evaluated [32]. It is argued that
motion information has to be disguised when motion infor-
mation is very important to protect (e.g., military). Spanos
and Maples algorithm [32] reveals motion information
especially when many blocks are intracoded in P- and B-
frames. The proposed technique is an enhancement and
improvement to the method proposed in [32]. It requires
the transmission of additional information. The proposed
scheme consists in the following.
(i) Take all I-blocks and parse the obtained stream into
64-bit segments, encrypt all of them using DES if
the last segment is less than 64-bits then leave it
unencrypted.
(ii) For predicted blocks in P- and B-frames.
(iii) Group all predicted block headers in one header sub-
bitstream.
(iv) Group all prediction block data in one data sub-
bitstream.
(v) Parse the header sub-bitstream into 64-bit segments
and DES encrypt them.
(vi) Concatenate the encrypted header sub-bitstream
with the data sub-bitstream.
(vii) To allow decoding, the length of the header sub-
bitstream is transmitted in each slice (in the user sec-
tion of each slice), this introduces a slight overhead.
(a) Tunability: no tunability is allowed.
(b) Visual degradation: the encrypted content is not
MPEG compliant, and thus cannot be viewed
without decryption.
(c) Cryptographic security: the algorithm can be
considered as secure enough.
(d) Encryption ratio: high encryption ratio is
required (intracoded blocks represent 30% to
60% of the bitstream).
(e) Compression friendliness: a slight overhead is
introduced to indicate the header sub-bitstream
length.
(f) Format compliance: no MPEG compliant; a
parser module has to be implemented to inter-
face the encryption/decryption system with the
MPEG-1 encoder/decoder.
(g) Error tolerance: poor error tolerance is achieved
due to avalanche property of DES cipher.
(h) Data type: video.
Cheng and Li, 2000. In [35], selective encryption is proposed
for quadtree compression algorithm. The compressor output
is partitioned into two parts; an “important part” that con-
sists of the quadtree structure, and an “unimportant part”
that consists of the leaf values. No encryption algorithm is
specified, only the important part is encrypted.
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: high-visual degradation can be
achieved only for images with high information rate
(many colors, details, etc.). But quadtree compres-
sion is more eﬃcient at low bitrates (for images with
low information).
(c) Cryptographic security: no encryption algorithm is
specified in [35]. Independently from the encryption
algorithm used, brute force attack is practical for low
information images where quadtree structure is very
simple.
(d) Encryption ratio: low encryption ratio is required for
typical images with low information content, about
14%. For high bitrate image, the encrypted part can
reach about 50%.
(e) Compression friendliness: the encryption is performed
after compression, no impact on the compression
eﬃciency is observed.
(f) Format compliance: quadtree is not part of any
compression standard.
(g) Error tolerance: depends on the encryption primitive
used to encrypt quadtree structure.
(h) Data type: image.
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Cheng and Li, 2000. The wavelet-based compression algo-
rithm SPIHT partitions the data into two parts [35]. The first
part can be considered as the “important part,” it consists
of significant information (of coeﬃcients and sets) for the
two highest levels of the pyramid and the initial threshold
parameter n of significance computation (Tn). The second
part is the “unimportant part,” it consists of sign bits and
refinement bits. No encryption algorithm is specified, only
the important part is encrypted.
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: the algorithm is not format
compliant and therefore encrypted content cannot be
viewed without decryption key.
(c) Cryptographic security: if the two highest resolutions
are very small, brute force attack becomes possible to
guess the initial threshold and significance informa-
tion.
(d) Encryption ratio: due to the energy concentration
obtained by the DWT, only 7% of the bitstream is
encrypted.
(e) Compression friendliness: no impact on compression
eﬃciency.
(f) Format compliance: SPIHT is not part of any com-
pression standard. In addition, since SPIHT algo-
rithm is context based, no decoding/processing is
possible without the knowledge of the first signifi-
cance bits.
(g) Error tolerance: poor error tolerance is achieved due
to the context nature of SPIHT.
(h) Data type: image and video.
Droogenbroeck and Benedett, 2002. The JPEG Huﬀman coder
terminates runs of zeros with codewords/symbols in order
to approach the entropy. Appended bits are added to these
codewords to fully specify the magnitudes and signs of
nonzero coeﬃcients, only these appended bits are encrypted
(using DES or IDEA) [36].
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: high-visual degradation is achiev-
able.
(c) Cryptographic security: about 92% of the data is
encrypted using well-scrutinized symmetric ciphers.
It would be very diﬃcult to break the encryption
algorithm or try to predict the encrypted part.
(d) Encryption ratio: very high encryption ratio is
required (about 92%).
(e) Compression friendliness: the encryption is separated
from the Huﬀman coder and has no impact on the
compression eﬃciency.
(f) Format compliance: JPEG compliant.
(g) Error tolerance: poor error tolerance is achieved due
to avalanche property of symmetric ciphers used.
(h) Data type: image.
Sadourny and Conan, 2003. In [37], a signaling scheme is
proposed for JPSEC [38]. JPSEC is Part 8 of JPEG2000,
called also secure JPEG2000. An important eﬀort has been
made in JPSEC to provide a standardized framework to
implement security tools and services such as selective
encryption, authentication, integrity, and so on. In [37],
the signaling scheme proposed is intended to support
selective encryption in JPSEC. Two marker segments are
used, security components description (SCD) to signal the
presence of protected parts in the bitstream and associated
encryption parameters and codestream security information
(CSI) to signal each individual protected part encryption
parameters such as the protection method, some integrity
data (hash values, signatures, etc.).
(a) Tunability: high flexibility is allowed by the signaling
information to encrypt diﬀerent parts with diﬀerent
encryption parameters.
(b) Visual degradation: the tenability of the scheme
allows tunable visual degradation.
(c) Cryptographic security: depends on encryption
parameters.
(d) Encryption ratio: depends on encryption parameters.
(e) Compression friendliness: the paper presents few
overhead tests on encrypted data. A single set of
encryption parameters is tested yielding a signaling
overhead of 104 bytes. The size of the overhead needs
to be measured with respect to image file size and
with diﬀerent encryption parameters.
(f) Format compliance: JPEG2000 and JPSEC compliant.
(g) Error tolerance: depends on encryption parameters,
for example, in the experiments presented in [37],
DES is used in CFB mode for encryption which yields
poor error tolerance due to chaining mode.
(h) Data type: image.
Wu and Deng, 2004. The proposed encryption scheme [39] is
a JPEG2000 compliant algorithm which iteratively encrypts
codeblock contribution to packets (CCPs). The encryption
process acts on CCPs (in the packet data) using stream
ciphers or block ciphers. The described proposal is based
mainly on stream ciphers with arithmetic module addition.
The key stream is generated using RC4. Each CCP is
iteratively encrypted until it has no forbidden codewords (in
the range [0XFF90, 0XFFFF]) because this range is reserved
for packet headers and is necessary for error resiliency and
resynchronization.
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: depends on the number of CCPs
encrypted.
(c) Cryptographic security: iterative encryption of CCPs
may give a hint for side channel attacks (e.g., timing
attack).
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(d) Encryption ratio: depends on the number of CCPs
encrypted. However, the number of iterations per
CCP increases exponentially with CCP length [40]
which increases the overall eﬀective encryption ratio.
(e) Compression friendliness: no impact on compression.
(f) Format compliance: fully compliant to JPEG2000 bit-
stream and preserving scalability and error resiliency
which are desirable properties in JPEG2000.
(g) Error tolerance: the use of RC4 causes important error
propagation.
(h) Data type: image and video.
Norcen and Uhl, 2003. JPEG2000 is an embedded bitstream.
In addition, most important data is sent at the beginning
of the bitstream. Based on these observations, the proposed
scheme consists in AES encryption of selected packet data
[41]. The algorithm uses two optional markers start of
packet (SOP) marker 0xFF91 and end of packet (EPH)
marker 0xFF92 to identify packet data. Then, this packet
data is encrypted using AES. CFB mode is used because the
packet data has variable length. The experiments have been
conducted on two kinds of images (lossy and lossless com-
pressed), with diﬀerent progression orders (resolution and
layer progression orders). The evaluation criterion was the
visual degradation obtained for a given amount of encrypted
data. It was found that for the lossy compressed images,
layer progression gives better results. For lossless compressed
images, resolution progression gives better results.
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: high-visual degradation is achiev-
able by encrypting 20% of the data.
(c) Cryptographic security: visual degradation is not the
unique criterion that characterizes the security of the
algorithm. In [5], the visual degradation achieved is
very high while the algorithm security is very weak.
(d) Encryption ratio: 20% of the data is encrypted to
achieve an acceptable level of visual degradation.
However, only resolution and layer progressions are
considered.
(e) Compression friendliness: no impact on compression.
(f) Format compliance: not JPEG2000 compliant.
Indeed, forbidden codewords in the range [0XFF90;
0XFFFF] can be generated by the AES-CFB mode.
(g) Error tolerance: AES in CFB mode has poor error
tolerance.
(h) Data type: image and video.
Stu¨tz and Uhl, 2006. In [40], the algorithm proposed by
Wu and Deng [39] is revisited. The complexity of the
iterative encryption of CCPs was less than estimated in
[39], Stu¨tz and Uhl gave a more exact formulation of the
CCPs distribution and hence for the encryption complexity
[40]. The number of rounds needed to achieve compliant
codestream increases exponentially with the CCPs length.
In addition, experimental results were conducted to test the
practicality of both CCPs and packets iterative encryption.
CCPs iterative encryption can be well performing if the
compression parameters are well selected (use of suﬃcient
quality layers and/or small precincts with small codeblocks).
On the other hand, reducing codeblocks size severely impact
compression performance. For packets iterative encryption,
it was shown that the distribution of packets length make it
impractical. This shows that Wu and Deng approach is not
general for JPEG2000 compressed images and special care
has to be taken when selecting compression parameters.
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: depends on the number of CCPs
encrypted.
(c) Cryptographic security: iterative encryption of CCPs
may give a hint for side channel attacks (e.g., timing
attack).
(d) Encryption ratio: depends on the number of CCPs
encrypted.
(e) Compression friendliness: small codeblocks adversely
impact compression performance; the MQ coder
performs better on large codeblocks. In addition
for small packets, the packet headers and marker
sequences (e.g., SOP and EPH) will represent an
important fraction of the bitstream.
(f) Format compliance: JPEG2000 compliant, but the
proposed technique is not applicable for any set
of compression parameters (many quality layers are
needed and small codeblocks).
(g) Error tolerance: the use of RC4 causes important error
propagation.
(h) Data type: image and video.
Engel, Stu¨tz, and Uhl, 2007. In [42], a syntax-compliant
encryption method is proposed for JPEG2000. Each code-
block CCP or segment is independently encrypted. The
method is based on a new format compliant encryption
called ciphertext switching encryption (CSE). A stream
cipher is used for encryption with backward checking, each
time a forbidden codeword is generated by encryption, it is
switched back to plaintext and neighboring codewords are
checked back for compliance. This process is iterated until
no forbidden codeword is found.
(a) Tunability: not tunable.
(b) Visual degradation: high-visual degradation can be
achieved.
(c) Cryptographic security: each time a forbidden code-
word is generated, it is switched back to plaintext. In
addition, switching impacts all previously encrypted
bytes, backward check is necessary for each switched
byte. The number of bytes sent in plaintext can be
unpredictable.
(d) Encryption ratio: depends on the number of CCPs
encrypted. However, important memory is required
to buﬀer the previously encrypted bytes for backward
check. This check is performed after each byte
encryption.
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(e) Compression friendliness: one major advantage of this
scheme is its compression friendliness. Indeed, a
negligible overhead of 11 bytes is introduced. Only
a short global IV (initial value) is inserted in the
bitstream main header. This global IV is used in
generating IVs for independent CCPs encryption.
(f) Format compliance: JPEG2000 compliant with fine
granularity scalability.
(g) Error tolerance: the main drawback of this scheme is
the need to do backward checking and switching if
necessary. Indeed, a single byte error could impact
the whole CCP decryption due to the dependency
between bytes encryption.
(h) Data type: image and video.
Table 1 summarizes the related work with respect to each
criteria described above. The main symbols used are
(i) “+” for satisfied criterion,
(ii) “−” for nonsatisfied criterion,
(iii) “H” for high,
(iv) “V” for variable, it is appreciated that visual degra-
dation is variable in order to adapt to diﬀerent
application requirements,
(v) “?” for nonspecified.
It is desirable that visual degradation is variable and dynam-
ically tunable to adapt to diﬀerent application requirements.
Encryption ratio needs to be minimized. Grayed boxes
indicate unsatisfied criteria.
4. DISCUSSION AND PERSPECTIVES
4.1. Discussion
As we can see from state-of-the-art summary and Table 1,
trading oﬀ all aforementioned criteria is a crucial task. We
can observe that tunability, cryptographic security, and error
tolerance are the main unsatisfied criteria. In the following
sections, each of these criteria is discussed.
4.1.1. Tunability
Selective encryption algorithms based on static encryption
parameters do not allow tunability. Tunability is a desirable
property especially for content protection systems targeting
diﬀerent applications with diﬀerent requirements in terms
of security or visual degradation and diﬀerent devices with
diﬀerent capabilities in terms of memory, computational
power, or display capabilities. It is therefore appreciated
to design a tunable selective encryption algorithm with
dynamic encryption parameters. Signaling information can
be inserted within the bitstream in order to indicate the
location of encrypted parts and encryption primitives and
functionalities that are used.
4.1.2. Cryptographic security
Very few papers have proposed a serious evaluation of the
security of selective encryption algorithms. In most cases,
visual distortion (measured using the PSNR) is used as
the exclusive criterion for such purpose. However, visual
degradation remains a subjective measure. In addition, it has
been shown that some selective encryption algorithms that
yield important visual distortion may have important secu-
rity leakages [17, 18]. Cryptanalysis of selective encryption
algorithms rely on key recovery (if encryption key space is
not large enough) or prediction of encrypted part. Hence,
cryptographic security should rely on
(i) the encryption key (of a well-scrutinized encryption
algorithm);
(ii) unpredictability of the encrypted part.
As shown in Section 1.1, postcompression selective encryp-
tion algorithms are more suited for selective encryption from
the security point of view. Indeed, compression eliminates
data correlation which reduces the predictability of the
encrypted part.
Very few works have been reported on the unpredictabil-
ity of the encrypted part. Security of the selective encryption
algorithm depends on how much and which parts of a
message we have to encrypt to ensure that brute force on
the encryption key space is easier than brute force attack
on the plaintext itself. Otherwise, the attacker could bypass
encryption and concentrate his eﬀort on predicting the
plaintext. It is hard to find an absolute measure for security.
Instead, we define indirect measures that could approximate
the security of a selective encryption algorithm. Examples
of such measures are entropy, unicity distance guesswork,
and α-work factor [43]. Entropy, as suggested by Shannon
[1], measures the message uncertainty. It defines the message
randomness. It is used to calculate unicity distance [1] which
is an approximation of the minimum number of ciphertexts
needed in a ciphertext-only attack to yield a unique solution.
Guesswork, as suggested in [44, 45], measures the expected
number of guesses to perform in optimal brute force attack
(where the attacker has perfect knowledge about symbols
probability distribution) to find the plain message. In [44,
45], the authors showed that it is not possible to find
simple bounds for guesswork (and α-work factor) based
on entropy. They found that guesswork can be arbitrarily
large while entropy tends to zero. In [44], the author
considers entropy inappropriate as confidentiality measure
in ciphertext attacks. Based on these observations, [43] pro-
poses guesswork as measure for confidentiality of selectively
encrypted messages. We investigate the implications of these
results on postcompression selective encryption algorithms.
We consider a message M, compressed by a “perfect
compressor.” M is composed of n symbols. We arbitrarily
choose ne symbols that will be encrypted (ne ≤ n), X
designates the encrypted part. The remainder of the message
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Table 1: Summary of related work with respect to each criterion; grayed boxes indicate unsatisfied criteria.
Pre
[5], 1996 − H − ?
−
+ −
(Compression drop = 40%)
[12, 13], 1998 − H − ? ? + −
[14], 1999 − H − ? ? + −
[15], 2002 − H −
− − + −
(>37.5%)
[16], 2002 − H −
− +
+
20% (compression drop <5%)







[19], 1995 + − ? − + −
[11, 21], 2001 − H − V + −
[24], 2001 − H +
+ − + −
−
(<15%)
[25], 2002 − − − +
++
− −
[26], 2004 + V − V − +
[29], 2004 + V − V + + −
[30], (2005) − H
H




[31], 2006 − − −
Post
















[37], 2003 + V ? V
?
+
(depends on encryption parameters)
[39], 2004 − V − V + + −




[40], 2006 − V − V − + −







1 2 3 · · · n
1 symbol
X : ne symbols
Figure 7: Selectively encrypting a message M, only gray units are
encrypted.
We will evaluate the diﬃculty for an attacker to guess the
encrypted part X in a brute force attack and try to find
conditions that make brute force attack on the key space
easier than optimal brute force attack on the plaintext space.
We assume that the attacker knows the length and the
location of the encrypted part and is able to recognize when
a right guess occurs.
Perfect compression implies that all source redundancies
are eliminated and that all symbols in the compressed mes-
sage M are independent and identically distributed. Hence,
X can be considered as a discrete random variable that
takes its values in the language Lne , X ∈ {X1,X2 · · ·X|L|ne }
with L being the symbols space and |L| being its cardi-
nality. The attacker would try to guess the value of X by
trying all possible values in the decreasing order of their






16 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
Note that for perfect compression, all symbols are equally








Now, if we consider the guesswork on the key space (of k










From (4) and (5), we can conclude that brute force attack
on the message space is harder than key guessing if W(X) ≥
W(K). In other terms,
|L|ne ≥ 2k. (6)
This yields a minimum number of bytes encrypted
ne,min ≥ klog2
(|L|) . (7)
This result is fundamental especially for postcompression
algorithms that perform encryption on entropy coded data.
Since entropy coders can be considered, to a certain extent,
as perfect compressors, it is required to encrypt at least ne,min
bytes. This minimum value gives the optimal encryption
ratio while achieving cryptographic security. Such a result
could be used to optimize encryption ratio in some proposals
for JPEG2000 selective encryption, where selected packet
data are encrypted [37, 39–42]. As codeblock contributions
to packets (CCPs) are compressed independently and each
CCP can be considered as “perfectly compressed,” it is then
required to encrypt only ne,min bytes per CCP to achieve
the same visual degradation while still guaranteeing cryp-
tographic security. An important encryption ratio reduction
could then be achieved.
4.1.3. Error tolerance
A main challenge in selective encryption algorithms is to
design secure schemes that are error tolerant. Since most
standard ciphers have strong avalanche eﬀect, they provide
poor error tolerance. Indeed, in networks prone to errors,
a single bit error in the encrypted part will result in many
erroneous bytes in the decrypted part. This is due to diﬀusion
property of ciphers. Error tolerance and security seem to
have antagonistic behaviors.
As a consequence, it is important to trade oﬀ security
and error tolerance. It is then appreciated to avoid chaining
modes of encryption algorithms [37, 41]. AES in CTR mode
or any other cipher that encrypts data blocks independently
oﬀer a good balance between security and error tolerance.
4.2. Perspectives and future works
Although an important and rich variety of selective encryp-
tion algorithms have been proposed in the literature, we
believe that many research areas remain open in this field.
(i) Can we design a selective encryption for any com-
pression algorithm? We believe that some compres-
sion algorithms are more cooperative and could
be better candidates for selective encryption. For
example, compared to MPEG, JPEG2000 is a very
good candidate to selective encryption; this is due
to its flexibility (embedded encoding, block-based
encryption, many progression orders, local region
access, etc.). These properties can be very useful in
designing a flexible selective encryption algorithm
in order to meet a larger set of requirements and
target more applications. In future works, we will
focus on designing selective encryption algorithms
for JPEG2000.
(ii) Can we build a rule of thumb to design a good
selective encryption algorithm? The study we make
here shows the bad choices to avoid when trying
to design a selective encryption algorithm. For
example, a selective encryption that relies only on
random permutations is totally insecure since it is
easily breakable by chosen-plaintext attacks. Energy
concentration does not mean intelligibility concen-
tration, and therefore, selectively encrypting low-
frequency coeﬃcients does not necessarily give a
suﬃcient level of security or visual degradation.
(iii) Can we design a selective encryption that can be
used in any kind of application? We believe that it
is feasible to design a flexible selective encryption
algorithm that is tunable and allows to trade oﬀ a
certain number of parameters in order to target a
large set of applications. The algorithm proposed in
[26, 37] good examples.
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